Brightline is a privately owned and operated intercity passenger railroad [E1]. OpCo runs trains on about 235 miles of double track between Miami and Orlando International Airport, with stations at Miami, Aventura, Fort Lauderdale, Boca Raton, West Palm Beach and Orlando. South of Cocoa it shares the Florida East Coast Railway corridor under a perpetual passenger easement; the 40 miles from Cocoa to the airport are passenger-only and leased from state and airport authorities [E1,E10]. South Florida service began in 2018, was suspended from March 2020 to November 2021, and the Orlando extension opened on 22 September 2023 [E1].
OpCo earns money from fares and from food, beverage, parking and other ancillary revenue; it has no availability payment and no government revenue guarantee. Demand risk sits entirely with the lenders. In the twelve months to June 2026 OpCo carried 3,358,022 riders, 1,993,873 of them on long-distance trips to or from Orlando, and booked $232.1M of revenue at an average fare of $55.63 (Exhibits 1–3). Growth is steady: riders rose 17.9% and revenue 22.4% year on year in the second quarter of 2026. The trailing-12-month figure to July 2026 was 3,391,938 riders; annualising the first seven months of 2026 gives 3,564,110, a figure that ignores the strong first quarter.
The 2024 financing. In May 2024 OpCo refinanced through $2,219.3M of tax-exempt Series 2024 bonds issued by the Florida Development Finance Corporation (FDFC). Assured Guaranty insures three term bonds totalling $1,133.4M; the other $1,085.8M is uninsured. Coupons are 5.00%–5.50%, interest is paid on 1 January and 1 July, and maturities run from 2034 to 2053. The parents raised more debt against their interests in OpCo and in planned extensions: $925.0M and $285.71M of AAF Operations Holdings (HoldCo) bonds, $985.0M of commuter bonds and $1,118.8M of Brightline East notes (Exhibit 5).
What went wrong. The official statement projected about 8.0 million riders and $695M of ticket revenue by 2026 (Exhibit 4). OpCo's auditors expressed substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern in the FY2025 statements [E7]. On 1 January 2026 OpCo used its debt service reserve to pay bond interest [E8]. From May 2026 it raised bridge notes at a 70% issue price, and the HoldCo and commuter bonds went into repeated grace-period extensions [E3]. On 24 September 2026 seventeen parent entities filed prearranged Chapter 11 cases in New Jersey; OpCo did not file [E10,E14].
The RSA. Assured, the MFG and other creditors signed the RSA on 25 September 2026 and amended it on 29 September 2026 [E2]. It keeps every bond's principal and the Assured policy in place. Consenting OpCo bondholders defer three coupons to 1 January 2031. OpCo raises $490.0M of exit notes: the $140.0M first-lien notes in this case and $350.0M of second-lien Junior Exit Notes, whose buyers receive 95% of New HoldCo. Until exit, OpCo runs on a $257.7M in-court Senior Secured Brightline Facility at 10.0% PIK plus an 8.0% fee (Exhibit 6).
Management. OpCo has no employees; an affiliate, Brightline Management, runs it under a management agreement. Entities managed by a Fortress affiliate indirectly own a majority of the parents [E10]. The case uses no individual names.
Demand drivers are South Florida population and tourism, airport traffic at Orlando, highway congestion on I-95 and the Florida Turnpike, and fares. The 2026 monthly reports show 88% of riders are Florida residents (July 2026) and about 36 departures a day [E3]. Riders and revenue are seasonal: the first quarter is the strongest and the third the weakest (Exhibit 2). The nearest competition is driving, air between South Florida and Orlando, and intercity bus.
The credit market has already priced the restructuring. On 28 September 2026 a $139M block of uninsured senior OpCo bonds traded at 45.5, against 64.0 on 8 April 2026; insured OpCo bonds traded at 95.6 on 2 October 2026; and the 12% HoldCo junior bonds due 2059 traded at 5.37 and 8.0 on 5 October 2026 and 6 October 2026 [E9]. Fitch cut the OpCo bonds to C from CC on 1 October 2026, calling the RSA a distressed debt exchange [E9]. In corporate private credit, the direct-lending spread premium over broadly syndicated loans was about 155bp on a trailing-12-month basis and 140bp year to date at 30 June 2026 (PitchBook LCD data cited by Portage Point) [E13]. Rates: the Federal Reserve raised the fed funds target to 3.75%–4.00% on 16 September 2026 [E12]; 1M CME Term SOFR was 3.925% on 9 October 2026 [E11].
| FY23A | FY24A | FY25A | LTM Jun-26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Riders (passenger trips) | 2053893 | 2763512 | 3116323 | 3358022 |
| Total revenue, audited ($M; LTM on monthly-report basis) | 87.7 | 187.9 | 214.0 | 232.1 |
| Passenger ticket revenue, audited ($M; LTM on monthly-report basis) | 65.1 | 152.5 | 173.2 | 186.8 |
| Average fare ($; LTM recomputed) | $31.70 | $55.18 | $55.59 | $55.63 |
| Train-level EBITDA ($M, IC Simulator calculation) | (17.7) | 30.7 | 72.3 | n/d |
| EBITDA after corporate costs ($M, operating loss + D&A) | (86.1) | (28.0) | 13.3 | n/d |
| Net loss | (306.7) | (548.7) | (233.1) | n/d |
| Net cash used in operating activities | (80.8) | (196.8) | (133.5) | n/d |
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